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Abstract
Countries whose citizens have liberal ideals are less biased toward domestic equity. Data
from 30 countries suggests that economic as well as social liberalism is associated with
proportionally higher foreign equity holdings. A one standard deviation increase in the
level of economic (social) liberalism relative to time-series and cross-sectional averages,
is associated with a 5% (2%) relative decrease of home equity bias. These results hold
after controlling for standard rational and behavioral explanations of the home equity
bias as well as country and time fixed effects.
1 Introduction
According to modern asset pricing theory, investors should hold the world market port-
folio. As French and Poterba (1990) put it, “Since fortunes of nations do not always move
together, investors can diversify their portfolios by holding assets in different countries.” Nev-
ertheless, investors seem to ignore the diversification benefits of international equity investing
and hold portfolios that are highly concentrated on domestic equity. This pattern is labeled
“home equity bias” and has been documented by several studies [French and Poterba (1990),
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), etc.]
There has been a large amount of research trying to explain this anomaly with most
efforts having been directed at discovering rational explanations. This line of research has
so far yielded poor results. For instance, Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) show that direct
costs of international transactions, such as taxes and capital restrictions, cannot explain the
home equity bias in calibrated models, unless implausibly low coefficients of risk aversion are
assumed. It has also been postulated that since investing in foreign equities usually requires
an understanding of foreign accounting principles and legal environments, these information
acquisition costs render foreign investments unattractive. There is indeed indirect evidence
that these costs are both real and significant. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that mutual
fund managers earn abnormal returns in nearby investments. This indicates that investors
∗The authors are Ph.D students in Economics and Finance respectively at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. They can be reached at ebenos@uiuc.edu and mjochec2@uiuc.edu. We are grateful
to Jacques Miniane for providing his data on capital controls and to George Deltas, Josh Pollet and Anne
Villamil for helpful comments and suggestions. Evangelos Benos is also grateful to the Economics Department
at the University of Illinois for providing financial support. All errors are ours.
1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1325857
trade local securities at an information advantage. Jun-Koo Kan and Stulz (1997) find that
foreign investors prefer Japanese stocks that are better known to them to other Japanese
stocks with which they are less familiar and which have higher expected returns. Nevertheless,
these information costs also appear to be small when compared to the potential benefits of
international diversification [See Lewis (1999)].
The home equity bias is also difficult to rationalize as a means of hedging against vari-
ous forms of risk. Baxter and Jermann (1997) show that human capital returns are highly
correlated with domestic stock market returns but not with foreign stocks. Thus, the idea
that perhaps excess domestic holdings are a hedge against non-traded wealth such as human
capital, is rejected. If anything, according to Baxter and Jerman, investors should be short-
ing the domestic equity market to purchase foreign stock. Similarly, home equity holdings
cannot be thought of as a hedge against domestic inflation since that would require a positive
correlation between stock returns and inflation1. The idea that the diversification potential
already exists in domestic equities, by investing across several industries or in firms with
multinational operations, is also rejected in the data. Using a sample of European countries,
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) show that industrial structure explains very little of the
cross-sectional difference in country return volatility. Jacquillat and Solnik (1978) also show
that the betas of firms with multinational operations are, with respect to their home markets,
close to one and thus provide minimal diversification benefits.
Overall, the home equity bias still poses a significant challenge to the “rational agent”
paradigm and therefore researchers have more recently turned their attention to potential
behavioral explanations. Based on the experimental findings of Heath and Tversky (1991),
it has been hypothesized that familiarity may at least partially explain the home equity bias.
Heath and Tversky found that “people prefer betting on an equiprobable chance event when
they consider themselves knowledgeable, but not otherwise”. This suggests that people tend
to make bets when they feel they are more familiar with the context in which this bet is being
made. Empirical evidence confirms this finding. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that
investors in Finland are more likely to buy, hold and sell stocks of firms that communicate in
the investor’s native tongue and whose chief executives have the same cultural background.
On a different front, Morse and Shieve (2008) employ a set of questions from the World Values
Survey to measure patriotism across countries and then show that in a set of 53 countries,
their patriotism metric has incremental explanatory power over the home equity bias.
Our paper continues the trend of exploring whether behavioral and societal characteristics
impact the magnitude of the home equity bias. In particular, we examine if the home equity
bias may partly be influenced by a society’s set of economic and social ideals. We are
motivated to examine this possibility by the fact that individual choice is heavily influenced
by the ideas and perceptions that are dominant in a society at any given time2.
Since a defining characteristic of an economic or social ideology is the degree of freedom
afforded to individuals to act according to their preferences, we classify societies as more or
less liberal in the economic and social sense. When it comes to economics, a liberal society
is one that favors a smaller government, lower taxes, and thus more individual responsibility
for peoples’ well being. A less liberal society would rather see the government playing a
1The correlation between stock returns and inflation is actually negative. See Fama and Schwert (1977).
2See for example Louis et.al. (2005).
2
larger role in guaranteeing a minimum standard of living through transfers that are made
possible by higher taxes. It would also favor more government ownership of business. In the
social sense, a liberal society is again one that favors individual freedoms regarding aspects
of non-economic behavior. This practically boils down to less government regulation about
what individuals should or should not do. As an example, a socially liberal society would
be more tolerant toward homosexuality whereas a socially conservative society would be less
tolerant.
Why then should liberalism have any impact on peoples’ investment decisions? Regarding
economic liberalism, our intuition is that perhaps investors will exploit more the benefits of
international diversification if they have a stronger belief in the very economic ideology that
makes these opportunities possible. On the other hand, it may be less apparent why a
society’s degree of social liberalism (or lack thereof) should have any impact on the home
equity bias. Socially liberal societies are more keen to accept changes in social institutions
which usually involves relaxing the regulatory constraints that have been imposed by the
government. Examples abound and include: the legalization of prostitution, the separation of
church and state, the abolishment of discriminatory rules against homosexuals, etc. Socially
conservative societies are more reluctant toward such changes. We therefore think that the
level of social liberalism is a proxy of the extent to which societies are willing (for better or
worse) to embrace new ideas. This in turn means that perhaps they are also more willing
to invest abroad, since the ability of individuals to invest in foreign stock markets is also
relatively new. Overall, we hypothesize that societies, which in general embrace changes more
easily, will be more keen to exploit the new set of opportunities afforded by the liberalization
of capital markets.
To measure liberalism, we exploit as set of questions that were asked in the World Values
Survey (WVS) and we classify societies as more or less liberal in the economic and social
sense by the answers respondents give to these questions. We also construct control variables
for other popular explanations, both rational and behavioral, of the home equity bias. These
control variables are the same with the ones used in the Morse and Shieve (2008) study.
Overall, we have a panel of 30 countries spanning a 25-year period.
We find that more liberal societies, in both the economic and social sense, are significantly
less biased toward domestic equity. Our specification is robust to fixed country and time
effects. The results imply that a one standard deviation increase in the level of economic
liberalism relative to time-series and cross-sectional averages, is associated with a 5% relative
decrease of home equity bias. As for social liberalism, a one standard deviation relative
increase is associated with a 2% relative decrease of the home equity bias.
In the rest of the paper we describe the data and the variables, we present the main
results and conclude.
2 Data and Summary Statistics
We use annual data from 30 countries and over varying time frames within the 1980-2005
period. The set of countries in our sample is dictated by the availability of data but almost
all major economies and many developing ones are included. The number of observations
used in each test varies as in each specification different explanatory variables are used.
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2.1 Measuring the Home Equity Bias
We measure the level of the home equity bias in a given country by the difference of the
country’s domestic holdings to those implied by a capital asset pricing model. A country’s
domestic holdings is the fraction of equity investments made domestically over total equity
investments after accounting for foreign holdings domestically. More precisely, the year t
domestic holdings are defined as:
Domestic Holdings t = 1−
Foreign Assets t
Market Capt + Foreign Assets t − Foreign Liabilities t
(1)
where “Foreign Assets” is the amount invested by residents in foreign equities and “Foreign
Liabilities” is the amount invested by foreigners in domestic equities in a given year. “Market
Cap” is the country’s market capitalization. Our home equity bias measure is therefore:
HEBt = Domestic Holdings t −
Market Capt
World Market Capt
(2)
We obtain the data on foreign assets/liabilities from the IMF/IFS database and the market
capitalization values from Global Financial Data. Table 1 shows time-averaged values of
HEB for all the countries in our sample over three subperiods that make up the entire sample
time. A clear pattern that emerges is that the home equity bias measure is decreasing over
time for almost all countries. Furthermore, there is significant cross-sectional variation; for
instance, European countries tend to be less home biased than other developed and developing
countries.
2.2 Measuring Economic and Social Liberalism
To construct measures of economic and social liberalism we use the responses to specific
questions in the World Values Survey (WVS)3. The WVS has been carried out by an interna-
tional network of social scientists and has been administered in 78 countries, to a minimum
of 1,000 individuals per country, over four time periods: 1980-1982, 1990-1992, 1995-1997
and 1999-2001. Unfortunately, the earlier survey waves missed some of the countries and this
is the reason why our panel is unbalanced.
Since the idea of a limited role for the government in economic affairs lies at the core
of the doctrine of economic liberalism, we exploit two relevant questions in the WVS to
measure economic liberalism in different countries and over time. The first question asks
respondents how strongly they agree with the statement that people should take responsibility
to provide for themselves versus the government taking that responsibility. The second
question asks how strongly they agree with increased private ownership of business versus
increased government ownership of business. In both questions respondents are asked to give
a score between 1 and 10 with 10 meaning that they fully agree with the first proposition in
each question and 1 meaning that they fully agree with the second proposition. The country
average score is then our measure of economic liberalism with higher scores being indicative
of more liberal beliefs.
3www.worldvaluesurvey.org
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Table 2 Panel B shows the correlation of the country-and-time average scores of the two
questions. The high correlation indicates that the two questions measure the same thing.
Table 3 shows the average score of the two questions in each country and in each of the
survey waves. Several interesting patterns emerge here. First, developed countries tend to
be more liberal than developing ones. However, there also is significant variation among
developed countries with the US being more liberal than Europe and Europe being more
liberal than Japan and Korea. In fact Japan and Korea have almost as high scores as most
other developing non-OECD countries. The second pattern is that over the nineties and for
the countries in our sample, liberalism seems to have lost some ground to more conservative
thinking.
To measure the level of social liberalism we see how people respond to questions about
three social issues that are controversial in many countries. These are: homosexuality, abor-
tion and divorce. The survey asks respondents if each of these are justifiable or not. As
before, a score between 1 and 10 is given with 10 corresponding to “Always justifiable” and
1 to “Never justifiable”. Thus higher values are associated with more liberal societies in the
social sense.
Table 4 shows the correlation of the country-and-time average scores of the three ques-
tions. As before, the scores are highly correlated allowing us to use all three questions as
proxies for social liberalism. Table 5 shows the average score of the three questions in each
country and in each of the survey waves. As with with economic liberalism, developed coun-
tries are also more liberal in the social sense than developing ones. Europe is more liberal
than the US which in turn is more liberal than the Latin American and the Asian countries
of our sample with the exception of Japan. Furthermore, within Europe, Scandinavian coun-
tries appear to be more liberal than countries in the mainland and particularly those in the
South. Our data doesn’t show any significant trend over time.
2.3 Control Variables
In our empirical tests we control for a number of popular explanations of the home equity
bias. Our first control variable, “CapC” is a proxy for the transaction barriers in foreign
investment in each of the countries of our sample. This proxy is constructed using the IMF
Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions4. It is the average of
several dummies and so it takes values between 0 and 1. Higher values indicate more capital
controls and higher transaction costs. Intuition suggests that capital controls should magnify
the home equity bias; nevertheless, the related literature5 has found that these transaction
costs fail to explain it in its full magnitude.
We also control for the potential information acquisition costs involved in foreign invest-
ments. It is natural to think that the costlier it is to obtain information about a foreign equity
market the less prone domestic investors will be to invest in that market. Our information
cost control variable is motivated from a number of studies that show smaller distances to
be associated with lower information costs [e.g. Coval and Moskowitz (2001)]. Therefore, for
each country in our sample we proxy for the information acquisition cost by the sum of the
4See Miniane (2004) for the details of how this variable is constructed
5e.g. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994)
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market capitalizations of the neighboring countries (“MarCapN”). The market capitalization
values are in trillions of current US dollars.
The third control variable is the country’s Sharpe ratio. This is intended to capture the
quality of domestic investment opportunities and thus the magnitude of the diversification
benefit. Since a higher Sharpe ratio is indicative of a better return-risk tradeoff, it should
- ceteris paribus - be positively related to the home equity bias. We calculate the Sharpe
ratio each year and for each country using monthly observations over the previous five years
following Sharpe (1994). The country market return is usually that of a broad index and
the risk free rate is either the country three-month Treasury Bill rate or the country three-
month Interbank Borrowing Rate. The market and risk-free rates are obtained from Global
Financial Data.
A behavioral explanation of the home equity bias that is supported empirically in several
studies [e.g. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)] is that investors prefer domestic stocks because
they are more familiar with the investment environment at home. Familiarity seems to make
a difference when individuals face a decision that involves risk. Following similar studies [e.g.
Morse and Shieve] we use as a proxy for familiarity with foreign markets the percentage of
foreign born residents in a given country. This is motivated by the study of Bhattacharya
and Roznik who find that US investment in foreign countries is positively influenced by
the number of US residents who were born in that country. The relevant variable is the
“International Migration Stock”, (IMS) available in the World Bank WDI database.
We finally control for the level of patriotism in each country. Morse and Shieve show
that in a cross-section of 53 countries patriotism has incremental explanatory power over the
level of the home equity bias. They construct their patriotism measure from the answers that
respondents in different countries give to the question: “How proud are you to be [nationality
inserted ]?” The answers range from 1 to 4 with 1 corresponding to “not proud” and 4 to
“very proud”. This data is also from the World Values Survey. We use the exact same
procedure to construct our patriotism control variable. Table 6 presents summary statistics
for the control variables.
3 Empirical Tests and Results
3.1 Bivariate Analysis
We start our analysis by looking at bivariate relationships. Table 7 shows the simple
correlations between the dependent and explanatory variables. Because the variables that
are constructed from the WVS responses (SL, EL and pat) are only available during the
survey waves, the correlation coefficients are calculated from samples of different sizes.
Both of the explanatory variables of interest (SL and EL) are significantly negatively
correlated with the measure of home equity bias suggesting that a higher degree of liberalism,
in both the economic and social sense, is unconditionally associated with lower levels of home
equity bias. The correlation between these two variables is also high, indicating that socially
liberal countries tend to also be economically liberal. From the set of controls, only the
capital controls (CapC) and familiarity (IMS) proxies are significantly correlated with the
home equity bias metric. These results are very similar to the ones obtained by Morse and
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Shieve (2008). Finally, it is interesting to note the significantly negative correlation between
patriotism and social liberalism as well as the negative correlations of the capital controls
proxy with each of the liberalism measures.
3.2 Panel Regressions
A feature of our data is that the explanatory variables of interest are only available for
a maximum of four years for each country since they are constructed from the WVS which
was conducted in four waves. This leaves us with a very few (less than 60) country-year
observations for the empirical tests. To go around this problem we use for each country-
year that the observations are missing the most recent WVS value for that country. This
approach gives rise to a panel structure which in turn allows us to control for country and
time specific fixed effects. Being able to control for both types of fixed effects is important in
this particular study. On one hand, countries are inherently different in many characteristics
that potentially influence the home equity bias (e.g. location, wealth, legal environment,
tradition, etc.). On the other hand, the level of home equity bias is also likely to be affected
by world-wide time-specific factors such as technological advances that facilitate trading and
the easy access to information. Controlling for these factors by country and time dummies
is therefore important in avoiding an omitted variable bias.
We first regress our dependent variable (HEB) on the average of the three social liberalism
and the two economic liberalism scores controlling for capital controls (CapC), information
acquisition costs (MarCapN), the home market risk and return tradeoff (Sharpe), familiarity
with foreign cultures (IMS), patriotism (Pat) as well as country and time fixed effects. Thus,
our specification is:
HEBit = bSLit + cELit + dCapCit + eMarCapNit + fSharpeit
+ gIMSit + hPATit +
N∑
j=1
I[j=i]kj +
T∑
s=1
I[s=t]ls + uit
(3)
where SLi,t and ELi,t are the social and economic liberalism scores for country i in year t
and I[j=i],I[s=t] are the country and year dummies respectively. Since we control for country
and time fixed effects, we effectively have a differences in differences estimation. That is, we
look at how variations from cross-sectional means of variations from time-series means in the
independent variables affect the same kind of variations in the dependent variable. These
results are presented in Table 8.
Our variables of interest (EL and SL) are highly significant both separately and combined,
suggesting that as countries become relatively more socially and economically liberal they also
become relatively less biased toward domestic equity. The economic liberalism scores are more
significant both economically and statistically than the social liberalism ones perhaps because
the way people think about the economy is more important in determining their investment
behavior than is the way they think about social issues. The effect is also economically
significant. The coefficients of the last specification imply that a one standard deviation
increase in the social liberalism score is associated with a 2% drop in the home equity bias
metric and a one standard deviation increase in the economic liberalism score is associated
with a 5% drop in the home equity bias metric.
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Regarding the control variables, the results are also interesting. Capital controls do not
seem to have any significant effect on the home equity bias. Although the point estimate
of the coefficient has the expected sign, it is statistically insignificant. We interpret this as
evidence that the capital controls are not necessarily binding; even if the countries in our
sample imposed no controls on capital flows, investors would likely still prefer to invest in
domestic stock.
The coefficient on MarCapN is significant but contrary to what we would expect it is
positive. In our opinion, this variable simply does a poor job in capturing the potential
information costs involved in foreign equity investment. Perhaps geographic proximity is
not as important to international investing as it is to domestic investing. The reason why
the coefficient is significant simply has to do with the fact that on average, countries with
small market capitalizations have higher levels of home equity bias and they also border with
countries whose market capitalization is large.
The coefficient of the country Sharpe ratio is positive and significant as expected. That
is probably because investors in countries where the risk adjusted market returns are high
have ceteris paribus less of an incentive to invest abroad.
As we mentioned earlier, IMS is the percentage of foreign-born residents in a country and
proxies for familiarity. The significantly negative coefficient suggests that a higher degree
of familiarity with foreign cultures causes domestic investors to hold more foreign assets.
This is consistent with the findings of Bhattacharya and Groznik as well as the experimental
evidence in Heath and Tversky (1991).
Finally, the coefficient on patriotism is negative and significant. This may not necessarily
contradict the results of Morse and Shieve. Although they do account for country fixed
effects by looking at how time differences in patriotism affect time differences in the home
equity bias, they do not account for time specific effects; that is, they do not control for the
possibility that there are factors associated with time and which are more or less common
across countries that potentially affect both patriotism and the level of home equity bias. Our
specification does that by including year dummies. The negative coefficient implies that the
effect of patriotism beyond any time trends and after controlling for country-specific effects is
negative. Of course, it is rather counterintuitive to think that because patriotism increases the
home equity bias decreases. We suspect that what is really behind this relationship is a time
varying country effect6 that is related to both peoples’ patriotic feelings and their investing
behavior. It is plausible to think for instance that patriotic sentiment is associated with
investors’ optimism and/or changes in disposable income which also affects their tendency
to invest abroad. In this case, an increase in optimism (which would be associated to an
increase in patriotism) would cause investors to buy more foreign stocks and drive the home
equity bias down.
To highlight the importance of time specific effects, Panel B of Table 8 presents the coeffi-
cients of some of the time dummies7. Two things are worth noting here: First, the coefficients
become progressively smaller as time goes by. Second, they are all highly significant. This
suggests that the gradual decline of the home equity bias that is evident in the raw data is
to some extent caused by time specific factors that are largely common among countries.
6Because it is a time varying effect, it is not captured by the country dummies in our main specification.
7The omitted time dummies exhibit similar behavior.
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In Table 9 we look how the scores of the various economic and social liberalism questions
individually affect the home equity bias metric. Among the social liberalism questions, the
one on abortion has the most significant effect on the home equity bias metric. This could
be because abortion is perhaps the most controversial of the social issues that respondents
were asked to give an opinion on and thus countries that scored high on this question may
be the most socially liberal of all.
3.3 Non-linearities
In our next set of tests, we examine if any of the explanatory variables have a non-linear
effect on the home equity bias metric. We suspect that such effects will exist because of the
very nature of our regressors. For instance, we expect the effect of peoples’ liberalism (or
lack thereof) on their investment behavior to depend on the existence of domestic investment
opportunities (as captured by the country Sharpe ratio). If the domestic investment oppor-
tunities are good, investors may choose to invest domestically regardless of how liberal they
are; that is, liberalism may only play a role when investing domestically is not a good option.
A simple linear model assumes that the effects of the regressors are additive and ignores such
interactions. As a result, one could reach misleading conclusions.
Since we suspect that some of the variables could have a non-linear effect on the home
equity bias metric, we estimate a specification where we interact the social and economic
liberalism variables with selected regressors. We start by estimating the following specifica-
tion8:
HEBit = b1SLit + b2ELit + b3CapCit + b4MarCapNit + b5Sharpeit + b6IMSit
+ b7PATit + c1SLitCapCit + c2SLitSharpeit + c3SLitIMSit + d1ELitCapCit
+ d2ELitSharpeit + d3ELitIMSit +
N∑
j=1
I[j=i]kj +
T∑
s=1
I[s=t]ls + uit
(4)
The coefficients and p-values of the interaction terms appear in Panel A of Table 10. The
results suggest that only the familiarity proxy (IMS) exhibits an interaction effect with both
liberalism variables. This means that the effect of liberalism is magnified in the presence of
familiarity. Furthermore, economic liberalism (EL) appears to be interacting with capital
controls (CapC) with the intuitive explanation being that economic liberalism matters only
to the extent that investors are not prevented by capital restrictions from purchasing foreign
stocks.
To gain a better understanding of the statistical significance of the various explanatory
variables, we do a series of F-tests, since in a model with interaction terms the estimated
coefficients may be jointly significant even if they are individually insignificant. We first test
if a model that includes a given variable as a main effect or as a factor in an interaction term
has more explanatory power than a model that does not include the variable at all. Thus, if
for example we wish to test whether familiarity (IMS) adds explanatory power or not, our
8We do not interact the liberalism variables with “MarCapN” and “PAT” because of the opposite than
expected coefficients of these variables.
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null hypothesis will be:
H0 : b6 = c3 = d3 = 0 (5)
If this null is rejected, then the model that includes IMS as a stand alone variable and as
an interaction term, has more explanatory power over the home equity bias metric than a
model that does not include IMS at all. We also test whether the marginal effect of each of
the explanatory variables that we interact is significant or not. From model (4) the marginal
effect of (say) IMS on the home equity bias metric is:
∂HEBit
∂IMSit
= b6 + c3SLit + d3ELit
Since the effect depends on the value of the liberalism variables due to the non-linearity of the
specification, we test if the marginal effect is significant at the mean value of the liberalism
scores. Thus, our second type of null hypothesis is:
H0 : b6 + c3SL+ d3EL = 0 (6)
where SL and EL are the pooled averages of the liberalism scores. The p-values of both of
these F-tests for each of the variables as well as the point estimates of the marginal effects
are shown in Panels B and C of Table 10. The point estimates have the anticipated signs
and all null hypotheses are rejected at the 10% level while some are rejected at even lower
levels of significance. The liberalism variables remain highly significant while now we can
also reject the hypothesis that capital controls have no effect.
A concern with the estimation of model (4) however is that some p-values may be too
large because of multicollinearity. This can happen if the same variables appear more than
once in the model as factors of interaction terms. In order to address this issue and obtain a
more parsimonious model, we next drop from the regression those interaction terms that are
insignificant (SL×CapC, SL× Sharpe, EL× Sharpe) and re-estimate the reduced model:
HEBit = b1SLit + b2ELit + b3CapCit + b4MarCapNit + b5Sharpeit + b6IMSit
+ b7PATit + c3SLitIMSit + d1ELitCapCit + d3ELitIMSit
+
N∑
j=1
I[j=i]kj +
T∑
s=1
I[s=t]ls + uit
(7)
We then repeat the tests (5) and (6) for the coefficients of the remaining terms. These
results appear in Table 11. Indeed, the marginal effect of familiarity (IMS) and capital
controls (CapC) is now statistically more significant. The coefficients and p-values of the
marginal effects of the liberalism variables are similar as before and are skipped.
3.4 Further Tests
In the last section of the paper we do two more tests. First, we vary our dataset in an
attempt to see whether the effect of liberalism persists when countries with outlier regressor
values are excluded. For this, we re-estimate specification (3) excluding all Latin American
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countries. The reason we do this is that Latin American countries traditionally had much
higher levels of capital controls than the rest of the countries in our sample. This is verified in
our data. The country and time average value of the capital control variable (CapC) for Latin
American countries is 0.82, whereas the average for the rest of the sample is 0.46. If high
capital controls make it impossible for Latin American investors to purchase foreign stocks,
then the effect of the other variables in model (3) is distorted. The results of this test are
in Table 12. The liberalism coefficients are similar in magnitude and economic significance
to the ones derived from the full dataset. This supports our earlier conjecture that in the
case of the home equity bias, capital controls may not be a binding constraint; that is, even
if capital controls were low, the tendency of investors to purchase domestic stock would not
be greatly affected.
The second test is to see whether government transfers have any effect on the home equity
bias. In a country where the redistribution of wealth is substantial, there is presumably
less need for individuals to save for the future9. This could in turn mean that the home
equity bias in these countries is larger as individuals may not need (or may not be able) to
invest abroad. We thus add as a regressor to specification (3) the variable “GovEx”, the
amount of government expenditures as a percentage of GDP10. For this test, we restrict our
attention to the high-income OECD countries of our sample because we suspect that in these
countries government transfers will generally be more effective11. That is, in a non-OECD (or
generally poorer) country that (say) is plagued by corruption, a higher rate of government
expenditure may not necessarily translate to a higher level of social benefits. The test results
are in Table 13. Among the OECD countries of our sample there is significant variation in
government spending as a proportion of GDP (see Panel A); however, the relevant coefficient
is insignificant (Panel B). There are several reasons why this might be so. First, general
government expenditure may be an inaccurate measure of social benefits as it includes such
expenses as defense and infrastructure spending that do not directly affect the propensity
of individuals to save. Alternatively, social benefits may just have a second order effect on
the home equity bias, meaning that the main decision individuals make in the presence or
absence of such benefits is whether to participate in the stock market at all and not whether
to invest domestically or abroad.
4 Summary and Conclusions
The home equity bias is one of the big – yet to be fully understood – puzzles in financial
economics. This is largely because the potential rational explanations that have been pro-
posed so far cannot fully account for its magnitude. In an attempt to explain why investors
forgo important diversification benefits associated with international investing, researchers
have more recently been adding to their empirical specifications variables that proxy for
behavioral factors such as familiarity and patriotism.
9In these countries individuals will likely also have less disposable income to save due to higher taxation.
10Absolute government expenditure and GDP data in the local currencies is obtained from the IMF-IFS
database.
11The countries we exclude are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore,
South Africa and Turkey.
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Following this trend, we examine in this paper if liberalism (or conservatism) has any
incremental explanatory power over the level of the home equity bias. We make a distinction
between social and economic liberalism not only because these are different notions per se,
but mainly because we suspect that each one may separately affect peoples’ investment
behavior. We exploit the responses to selected questions in the World Values Survey to
construct country metrics of social and economic liberalism. Using data from 30 countries,
we then examine if these metrics help explain the home equity bias after controlling for the
level of a country’s degree of liberalization, the potential cost of information acquisition, the
country risk-adjusted average stock market return, the familiarity of the country’s residents
with foreign cultures and their level of patriotism.
We find that liberal societies, in both the economic and social sense, are conditionally
less biased toward domestic stock. The effect is economically significant: a one standard
deviation increase in our social (economic) liberalism metric is associated with a 2% (5%)
drop in the level of home equity bias. We interpret these results as evidence that peoples’
investment decisions are influenced by their core beliefs about the economy and the society
in which they live. It may come as no surprise that societies which have less trust to the open
market and instead favor more government intervention are less likely to invest in foreign
equities. It is however less apparent why social liberalism/conservatism should have any
effect on individuals’ investment behavior. We conjecture that social liberalism is a proxy for
a society’s willingness to accept changes in general and since in historical terms international
investing is modernity, socially liberal societies are more likely to pioneer the transition to
international investing.
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Table 1: Time series averages in percentage of the home equity bias measure (HEB)
for the countries in our sample over three subperiods of the sample time. In case
data is not available for all the years of a subperiod we simply average the available
annual observations in the subperiod. Blank spaces indicate no available data for that
subperiod.
Country Subperiods
1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2005
Argentina – 100 100
Australia 90 86 81
Austria 83 67 25
Belgium 71 60 54
Brazil – – 98
Canada 90 85 83
Chile – 94 81
Colombia 100 99 100
Denmark – 76 60
Finland 100 94 64
France 84 82 68
Germany 82 68 50
Greece – 98 94
India – 99 99
Italy 90 87 62
Japan – 80 79
Korea 100 99 96
Mexico – 100 100
Netherlands 70 60 33
Norway – 58 52
Philippines – – 99
Portugal – 84 65
Singapore – – 26
South Africa 98 94 86
Spain 98 94 83
Sweden 96 78 59
Switzerland 62 60 50
Turkey – 100 100
United Kingdom 73 68 60
United States 60 51 44
Mean 85 82 72
Std. Dev. 13 16 23
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Table 2: The two questions from the World Values Survey that we use as a measure
of economic liberalism are listed in Panel A. The correlation between the responses
to the two questions is presented in Panel B. To calculate the correlations we restrict
ourselves to the countries and years for which all three questions were asked. *, **
and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Economic Liberalism Questions
Question 1: Private ownership of business should be increased vs.
Government ownership of business should be increased
Question 2: People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs.
The government should take more responsibility to ensure that
everyone is provided for
Obs.: 52
Panel B: Correlation Matrix
Question 1 Question 2
Question 1 1
Question 2 0.70∗∗∗ 1
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Table 3: Average question score by country of the two economic liberalism questions:
“People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs. the government
should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” and “Private
ownership of business should be increased vs. government ownership of business should
be increased”. Each respondent gives a score between 1 and 10. 10 means that one
completely agrees with the first statement in each question and 1 means that one
completely agrees with the second statement. Thus, higher scores indicate that a
country is more liberal in the economic sense. Missing values indicate that either the
survey was not conducted in this country at the given time or that the particular
questions were not asked.
Survey Waves
Country 1980-1982 1990-1992 1995-1997 1999-2001
Argentina – 6.6 5.6 4.8
Australia – – 6.6 –
Austria – 7.6 – 7.3
Belgium – 6.6 – –
Brazil – 5.8 5.7 –
Canada – 7.3 – 6.6
Chile – 4.8 4.8 4.5
Colombia – – 4.7 –
Denmark – 7.0 – –
Finland – 7.1 6.2 6.6
France – 6.8 – 7.0
Germany – 7.2 5.6 6.4
Greece – – – –
India – 6.2 5.2 4.6
Italy – 6.1 – 6.1
Japan – 5.0 5.1 5.4
Korea – 6.5 4.7 4.7
Mexico – 6.1 5.6 5.3
Netherlands – 6.5 – 6.5
Norway – 6.6 6.1 –
Philippines – – 5.2 5.1
Portugal – 6.4 – 6.3
Singapore – – – 5.3
South Africa – 6.8 5.6 5.5
Spain – 5.5 5.1 4.7
Sweden – 7.2 6.9 –
Switzerland – – 7.6 –
Turkey – 5.0 5.6 5.3
United Kingdom – 5.9 – 6.4
United States – 7.7 7.5 7.1
Mean – 6.3 5.6 5.7
Std. Dev. – 0.8 0.9 0.9
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Table 4: The three questions from the World Values Survey that we use as a measure
of social liberalism are listed in Panel A. The correlations between the responses to
the three questions are presented in Panel B. To calculate the correlations we restrict
ourselves to the countries and years for which all three questions were asked. *, **
and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Social Liberalism Questions
Question 1: Is homosexuality justifiable?
Question 2: Is abortion justifiable?
Question 3: Is divorce justifiable?
Obs.: 68
Panel B: Correlation Matrix
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3
Question 1 1
Question 2 0.72∗∗∗ 1
Question 3 0.81∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 1
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Table 5: Average question score by country of the three social liberalism questions:
“Is homosexuality justifiable?”, “Is abortion justifiable?” and “Is divorce justifiable?”.
Each respondent gives a score between 1 and 10. 1 corresponds to “Never justifiable”
and 10 to “Always justifiable”. Thus, higher scores indicate that a country is more
liberal in the social sense. Missing values indicate that either the survey was not
conducted in this country at the given time or that the particular questions were not
asked.
Country Survey Waves
1980-1982 1990-1992 1995-1997 1999-2001
Argentina 3.4 4.0 4.5 4.1
Australia 4.4 – 5.1 –
Austria – 3.9 – 5.2
Belgium 3.5 4.3 – 5.1
Brazil – 3.2 3.4 –
Canada 3.9 4.9 – 5.3
Chile – 2.4 3.3 3.9
Colombia – – 2.7 –
Denmark 6.4 5.3 – 6.9
Finland – 6.0 5.4 5.8
France 4.7 4.9 – 5.7
Germany 4.4 4.7 6.3 5.4
Greece – – – 5.4
India – 2.4 2.4 3.4
Italy 4.2 4.6 – 4.7
Japan 3.6 3.7 4.5 5.2
Korea 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.6
Mexico – 3.8 3.3 3.7
Netherlands 5.1 6.3 – 6.7
Norway 4.5 4.8 5.7 –
Philippines – – 3.1 3.3
Portugal – 3.7 – 4.2
Singapore – – – 2.8
South Africa – 3.0 2.9 3.2
Spain 3.5 4.7 5.3 5.5
Sweden 5.3 5.4 7.3 7.7
Switzerland – 4.1 5.9 –
Turkey – 3.6 – –
United Kingdom 4.3 4.3 5.7 5.1
United States 3.5 4.2 4.4 4.7
Mean 4.3 4.2 4.4 4.7
Std.Dev. 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.3
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Table 6: Summary statistics of the control variables. “CapC” is a measure of the
capital controls in a given country and is taken from Miniane (2004). “MarCapN” is
the sum of capitalizations of neighboring countries in current trillion dollars. “Sharpe”
is a country Sharpe ratio. “IMS” is the percentage of foreign-born residents in a given
country. “Pat” is a patriotism measure constructed from peoples’ responses to the
question: “How proud are you to be [insert nationality]”?. Respondents give a score
between 1 and 4 with 1 corresponding to “Not proud at all” and 4 to “Very proud”.
Control Variables Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum
CapC 0.52 0.31 0.00 1.00
MarCapN 1.43 2.50 0.00 15.42
Sharpe 0.32 0.11 -0.08 0.61
IMS 8.00 8.00 0.00 42.00
Pat 3.35 0.29 2.60 3.82
Table 7: Simple correlations of the dependent and all independent variables. The
sample size varies between some correlations because of limited availability of some of
the variables. “CapC” is a measure of the capital controls in a given country and is
taken from Miniane (2004). “MarCapN” is the sum of capitalizations of neighboring
countries in current trillion dollars. “Sharpe” is a country Sharpe ratio. “IMS” is the
percentage of foreign-born residents in a given country. “Pat” is a patriotism measure
constructed from peoples’ responses to the question: “How proud are you to be [insert
nationality]”?. Respondents give a score between 1 and 4 with 1 corresponding to
“Not proud at all” and 4 to “Very proud”. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%,
5% and 1% respectively.
Correlations HEB SL EL CapC MarCapN Sharpe IMS Pat
HEB 1.00 – – – – – – –
SL -0.29∗∗ 1.00 – – – – – –
EL -0.42∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 1.00 – – – – –
CapC 0.54∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ 1.00 – – – –
MarCapN -0.06 0.11 0.03 -0.13∗∗∗ 1.00 – – –
Sharpe 0.00 0.45∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.00 0.09∗∗ 1.00 – –
IMS -0.54∗∗∗ 0.20 0.41∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.04 1.00 –
Pat 0.18 -0.43∗∗∗ -0.14 0.13 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 1.00
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Table 8: Panel A: Country and time fixed effects specification. The coefficients of the
country dummies are omitted. “HEB” is our home equity bias metric and is defined in
the text, equation (2). “SL” is the average score for each country and in a given year of
the two questions in Table 4, Panel A. “EL” is the average score for each country and
in a given year of the three questions in Table 2, Panel A. “CapC” is a measure of the
capital controls in a given country and is taken from Miniane (2004). “MarCapN” is
the sum of capitalizations of neighboring countries in current trillion dollars. “Sharpe”
is a country Sharpe ratio. “IMS” is the percentage of foreign-born residents in a given
country. “Pat” is a patriotism measure constructed from peoples’ responses to the
question: “How proud are you to be [insert nationality]”?. Respondents give a score
between 1 and 4 with 1 corresponding to “Not proud at all” and 4 to “Very proud”.
Panel B: The coefficients and p-values of selected time dummies.
Panel A SL EL CapC MarCapN Sharpe IMS Pat
Coefficients -1.91 – 2.58 0.53 17.43 -1.05 -21.32
p-values 0.02 – 0.30 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coefficients – -4.40 1.61 1.22 15.90 -1.71 -14.72
p-values – 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coefficients -2.16 -4.45 2.00 1.23 17.00 -1.54 -14.50
p-values 0.03 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B 2004 2002 2000 1998 1996 1994 1992 1990
Coefficients 4.68 5.57 5.40 11.47 16.48 21.48 21.63 21.43
p-values 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 9: Country and time fixed effects specification. The coefficients of the country
and time dummies are omitted. “HEB” is our home equity bias metric and is defined
in the text, equation (2). In Panel A it is regressed on “SL1”, “SL2” and “SL3”, the
country-average scores of each the three social liberalism questions shown in Table 2,
Panel A. In Panel B, “HEB” is regressed on each of the economic liberalism questions
shown in Table 4, Panel A. “CapC” is a measure of the capital controls in a given
country and is taken from Miniane (2004). “MarCapN” is the sum of capitalizations
of neighboring countries in current trillion dollars. “Sharpe” is a country Sharpe
ratio. “IMS” is the percentage of foreign-born residents in a given country. “Pat” is a
patriotism measure constructed from peoples’ responses to the question: “How proud
are you to be [insert nationality]?”. Respondents give a score between 1 and 4 with 1
corresponding to “Not proud at all” and 4 to “Very proud”.
Panel A SL1 SL2 SL3 CapC MarCapN Sharpe IMS Pat
Coefficients -1.21 – – 2.39 0.51 17.13 -1.09 -21.13
p-values 0.09 – – 0.35 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coefficients – -1.67 – 4.16 0.49 17.96 -1.06 -20.80
p-values – 0.02 – 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coefficients – – -1.62 3.06 0.54 17.05 -1.16 -21.79
p-values – – 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B EL1 EL2 CapC MarCapN Sharpe IMS Pat
Coefficients -4.90 – 3.73 1.09 15.02 -1.77 -18.07
p-values 0.00 – 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coefficients – -2.47 2.42 1.20 16.74 -1.74 -12.83
p-values – 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 10: Specification with interaction terms and country and time fixed effects. The
coefficients of the country and time dummies are omitted. In Panel A we report point
estimates and p-values of the interaction terms of model (4). In Panels B and C we
report point estimates of the regressor marginal effects and p-values of the F-tests of
the hypotheses (5) and (6). The dependent variable (HEB) is our home equity bias
metric and is defined in the text, equation (2). “SL” is the average score for each
country and in a given year of the two questions in Table 4, Panel A. “EL” is the
average score for each country and in a given year of the three questions in Table 2,
Panel A. “CapC” is a measure of the capital controls in a given country and is taken
from Miniane (2004). “Sharpe” is a country Sharpe ratio. “IMS” is the percentage of
foreign-born residents in a given country.
Panel A SL× CapC SL× Sharpe SL× IMS EL× CapC EL× Sharpe EL× IMS
Coefficients 2.21 2.14 -0.57 -6.49 -0.58 -1.43
p-values 0.54 0.50 0.01 0.05 0.89 0.00
Panel B CapC Sharpe IMS
H0 : b3 = c1 = d1 = 0 b5 = c2 = d2 = 0 b6 = c3 = d3 = 0
p-values 0.10 0.01 0.00
H0 : b3 + c1SL+ d1EL = 0 b5 + c2SL+ d2EL = 0 b6 + c3SL+ d3EL = 0
P. Est. 19.0 16.6 -0.73
p-values 0.02 0.10 0.10
Panel C SL EL
H0 : b1 = c1 = c2 = c3 = 0 b2 = d1 = d2 = d3 = 0
p-values 0.00 0.00
H0 : b1 + c1CapC + c2Sharpe+ c3IMS = 0 b2 + d1CapC + d2Sharpe+ d3IMS = 0
P. Est. -2.52 -7.50
p-values 0.00 0.00
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Table 11: Specification with interaction terms and country and time fixed effects. The
coefficients of the country and time dummies are omitted. In Panel A we report point
estimates and p-values of the interaction terms of model (7). In Panel B we report
point estimates of the regressor marginal effects and p-values of the F-tests of the
“reduced” hypotheses (5) and (6). The dependent variable (HEB) is our home equity
bias metric and is defined in the text, equation (2). “SL” is the average score for each
country and in a given year of the two questions in Table 4, Panel A. “EL” is the
average score for each country and in a given year of the three questions in Table 2,
Panel A. “CapC” is a measure of the capital controls in a given country and is taken
from Miniane (2004). “Sharpe” is a country Sharpe ratio. “IMS” is the percentage of
foreign-born residents in a given country.
Panel A EL× CapC SL× IMS EL× IMS
Coefficients -6.21 -0.62 -1.44
p-values 0.05 0.00 0.00
Panel B CapC IMS
H0 : b3 = d1 = 0 b6 = c3 = d3 = 0
p-values 0.06 0.00
H0 : b3 + d1EL = 0 b6 + c3SL+ d3EL = 0
P. Est. 16 -0.72
p-values 0.02 0.04
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Table 12: Country and time fixed effects specification excluding all Latin American
countries. The coefficients of the country and time dummies are omitted. “HEB”
is our home equity bias metric and is defined in the text, equation (2). “SL” is the
average score for each country and in a given year of the two questions in Table 4, Panel
A. “EL” is the average score for each country and in a given year of the three questions
in Table 2, Panel A. “CapC” is a measure of the capital controls in a given country and
is taken from Miniane (2004). “MarCapN” is the sum of capitalizations of neighboring
countries in current trillion dollars. “Sharpe” is a country Sharpe ratio. “IMS” is the
percentage of foreign-born residents in a given country. “Pat” is a patriotism measure
constructed from peoples’ responses to the question: “How proud are you to be [insert
nationality]”?. Respondents give a score between 1 and 4 with 1 corresponding to
“Not proud at all” and 4 to “Very proud”.
Latin America SL EL CapC MarCapN Sharpe IMS Pat
Excluded
Coefficients -1.95 – 2.00 0.44 17.59 -0.99 -22.57
p-values 0.02 – 0.45 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coefficients – -4.30 0.90 1.17 16.57 -1.65 -15.54
p-values – 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coefficients -2.19 -4.36 1.36 1.18 17.71 -1.48 -15.35
p-values 0.03 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 13: Panel A: Summary statistics for the “GovEx” variable for all OECD countries
in our sample.“GovEx” is government consumption as a percentage (%) of GDP. Panel
B: Country and time fixed effects specification for the OECD countries in our sample.
The coefficients of the country and time dummies are omitted. “HEB” is our home
equity bias metric and is defined in the text, equation (2). “SL” is the average score
for each country and in a given year of the two questions in Table 4, Panel A. “EL” is
the average score for each country and in a given year of the three questions in Table
2, Panel A. “CapC” is a measure of the capital controls in a given country and is
taken from Miniane (2004). “MarCapN” is the sum of capitalizations of neighboring
countries in current trillion dollars. “Sharpe” is a country Sharpe ratio. “IMS” is the
percentage of foreign-born residents in a given country. “Pat” is a patriotism measure
constructed from peoples’ responses to the question: “How proud are you to be [insert
nationality]”?. Respondents give a score between 1 and 4 with 1 corresponding to
“Not proud at all” and 4 to “Very proud”.
Panel A Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum
GovEx 18.9 4.6 7.6 30
Panel B SL EL GovEx CapC MarCapN Sharpe IMS Pat
Coefficients -2.54 -4.43 0.48 1.73 1.40 18.13 -1.38 -13.62
p-values 0.02 0.00 0.30 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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